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NOTES
VIDEO POKER AND THE LOTTERY CLAUSE:
WHERE COMMON LAW AND
COMMON SENSE COLLIDE
This is not a difficult legal question.
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 1868, delegate Timothy Hurley of Berkeley county
introduced a constitutional prohibition on lotteries for consideration before his
fellow delegates of the 1868 South Carolina Constitutional Convention in
Charleston.' The provision eventually passed without a single word of debate.2
While this silence seems unfortunate today,3 it is not at all surprising. The
delegates had considerably more pressing matters to discuss at the time, given
the herculean task before them of rebuilding the state's governmental structure
immediately following the Civil War. One hundred and thirty years later,
however, the meaning and scope of this constitutional provision have moved
to center stage, within the context of a statewide political debate over the
legality of video gambling machines.4
At publication, United States District Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
certified the question of whether video poker is an unconstitutional lottery for
determination by the South Carolina Supreme Court.5 In a prompt reply, the
* Charlie Condon, Editorial, Video Poker's Constitutionality Must Be Resolved Once and
forAll, THESTATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 30,1998, at A13. The question South Carolina Attorney
General Condon refers to is whether video poker constitutes a lottery and is therefore prohibited
under the South Carolina Constitution. In the Attorney General's opinion, the question is easily
answered in the affirmative. Id.
1. 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTrrUIONAL CONVENTION OF SoUr CAROLINA 69-70 (J.
Woodruff, reporter) (Charleston, S.C., Denny & Perry 1868) [hereinafter 1868 CONVENTION].
2. 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 773 (J.
Woodruff, reporter) (Charleston, S.C., Denny & Perry 1868).
3. This omission is especially unfortunate for those attempting to discern the original intent
behind the Lottery Clause.
4. Video gambling machines are commonly referred to as "video poker" in South Carolina.
See generally Michael Sponhour, 'Video Poker is a Cancer,' Governor's Plan: Ban the
Machines, Forgo the Revenues, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 14, 1998, at Al.
5. Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co., No. 3:97-2136-17 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 1998) (order
of certification to the Supreme Court of South Carolina) [hereinafter Order of Certification].
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state's highest court agreed to answer the certified question, citing the "public
interest" in resolving the issue quickly.6 The case responsible for Judge
Anderson's certification is Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co.,7 a class
action suit brought in federal court by gamblers against the video poker
industry.' By raising the lottery issue, the plaintiffs seek a court-ordered
preliminary injunction to discontinue the operation of all video poker machines
in the state due to their status as illegal lotteries.' This Comment addresses the
certified question-is video poker a lottery?
The answer to this question may determine the livelihood of an estimated
$2 billion per year statewide industry." Video poker has grown over the last
two decades from "aback-room game of dubious legality"" to become a major
player in South Carolina's economic and political life.' The burgeoning debate
over its continuing existence pits those who decry the moral evil and personal
destruction wrought by this gambling against those who defend the industry
because it provides thousands ofjobs and raises state revenues in the form of
license fees and taxes. 3 With these pressing interests at stake, whether or not
video poker is an illegal lottery is a question ripe for judicial determination. 4
6. Clif LeBlanc, Justices Will Rule on Poker: S.C. Supreme Court Puts Lawsuit on Legal
Fast Track, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 5, 1998, at Al (characterizing the court's
expedited timetable for answering the certified question as "fast-tracking" the issue).
7. No. 3:97-2136-17 (D.S.C. filed June 9, 1997).
8. Michelle R. Davis, Poker Suit a State Court Issue? Yes, Says U.S. District Judge
Anderson, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 7,1998, atB1. The plaintiffs in this class action suit
claim to be addicted to the video poker machines. Id.
9. Complaint, Johnson v. Collins Entertainment Co., No. 3:97-2136-17 (D.S.C. filed June
9, 1997). This class action suit also seeks multiple damage claims under a number of different
causes of action, including the following: RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations
Act), fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, unfair trade practices, conversion, civil
conspiracy, and statutory right to recover gambling losses. Id. See generally ClifLeBlane, Poker
Operators Draw No Aces, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Jan. 27, 1998, at BI (discussing Judge
Anderson's January 26th ruling allowing the RICO action to proceed, rejecting the defendants'
attempt to move the suit back to state court, andpermitting Attorney General Condonto intervene
in the suit on the side of the plaintiffs). Discussion of these causes of action, and indeed any
detailed treatment of this particular suit, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
10. Tony Horowitz, Dire Straights: In a Bible Belt State, Video Poker Mutates Into an
Unholy Mess, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1997, at Al. The magnitude of the video poker industry is




13. See Sponhour, supra note 4. See generally Horowitz, supra note 10 (characterizing
South Carolina's video poker industry as one of the most unregulated and "widest-open" forms
of gambling in the country).
14. See LeBlanc, supra note 6 and accompanying text. Justice Toal of the South Carolina
Supreme Court recently noted these interests and the need for judicial clarity in this area:
The owners of video game machines, as well as law enforcement officials
charged with the responsibility of seizing and destroying illegal gambling
devices, have a strong interest in knowing from week to week whether
(Vol. 49:549
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The intent behind this Comment is not to take sides in this political debate,
but rather to clarify the meaning and scope of the constitutional lottery
prohibition as applied to video poker." Toward this end, a general evolutionary
background of lotteries and video poker is provided as a starting point. Part II
discusses the history of lotteries in this country and of the constitutional
prohibition on lotteries in South Carolina. Part III examines the history of video
poker and the statutory scheme designed to regulate the industry. Part IV
examines case law from other states to determine whether video poker
constitutes a "lottery" under the conventional definition of that term. Part V
introduces an alternative approach to defining what constitutes a lottery, taking
into considerationthe logical inconsistency of the conventional definition of the
term.
I. LoTTERmS
A. History of Lotteries in the United States
The presence of lotteries 6 in this country predates the American
Revolution. 7 As early as 1612, Britain chartered a London company to raise
money via a lottery to support the colonial settlement in Jamestown.s Upon
revocation of this charter in 1624, the Jamestown colonists turned to domestic
certain machines are legal. Neither the owners nor law enforcement benefit
from judicial equivocation or vacillation on this issue.
State v. One Coin-Operated Video Game Mach., 321 S.C. 176,181,467 S.E.2d 443, 446 (1996).
15. The author has no economic, political, or personal ties to either side of the debate.
16. Consultation of legal and English language dictionaries proves unhelpful when
attempting to precisely define the term "lottery." Black's Law Dictionary is typical of most,
providing both broad and narrow definitions of the term. Because it is quite simple for each party
in a case like Johnson to cite from a particular dictionary definition of "lottery" to support its
view of the term (be it narrow or broad), the author does not consider it fruitful to devote
substantial space in this Comment to discussing these definitions.
However, for the interested reader, see BLACK'S LAWDICIONARY 947 (6th ed. 1990), which
defines lottery: "A chance for a prize for a price. A scheme for the distribution of a prize or
prizes by lot or chance, the number and value of which is determined by the operator of lottery."
See also AN AMEIucAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 677 (Springfield, Mass.,
Merriam 1857) ("A scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance, or the distribution itself.
Lotteries are often authorized by law."); IX THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTnONARY 43 (2d ed. 1989)
("An arrangement for the distribution of prizes by chance among persons purchasing tickets ....
[u]sually intended as a means of raising money for the benefit of the promoters, of the State, or
of some charitable institution"); WEBSTER'S TH[RNEWINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1338 (3d
ed. 1993) ("[A] scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance; ... a scheme by which
prizes are distributed to the winners among those persons who have paid for a chance to win them
usu[ally] as determined by the numbers on tickets as drawn at random ....").
17. See Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues andSocial Costs: A Historical Examination
of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REv. 11, 23 (1992).
18. Id. at 24. King James I chartered the Virginia Company of London to create and
administer this lottery. Id.
3
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lotteries to raise sufficient funds. 9 These lotteries were popular as an
alternative to taxes during a period when the country lacked a strong central
government.21 "Lottery proceeds were used to build cities, establish
universities, and even to help finance the Revolutionary War."2' The popularity
of these lotteries grew to the point that, by the early 1800s, twenty-four of the
thirty-three states in the union sanctioned lotteries as a valid mechanism for
supporting local improvement projects.' A description of how these lotteries
commonly operated follows:
The Legislature would first grant a charter to a lottery company for a
period of years in consideration of a stipulated sum in cash, annual
payment of further sum, and a percentage of the receipts from the sale
of tickets. Under such a charter the company was authorized to sell
tickets, or certificates of subscription to issue receipts therefor, and to
contract with agents to sell them on commission or otherwise. The
tickets or certificates entitled the holders to such articles as might be
awarded them, the distribution to be made in public, after advertising,
by the casting of lots, or by lot, chance, or otherwise in such manner
as directed by the by-laws of the corporation.'
By the mid 1800s the country experienced a backlash against lotteries.24 Two
overriding concerns drove this backlash, eventually engulfing the entire country
in an anti-lottery fervor: widespread fraud by lottery organizers and operators
and the attendant social problems related to gambling.' In 1821, New York
became the first state to pass a constitutional amendment prohibiting lotteries. 6
By 1860, all but three states proscribed lotteries by statute or constitutional
amendment." For most of the following one-hundred years, state involvement
in lotteries was virtually nonexistent.'
19.1d.
20. Id. at 12. The colonists considered lotteries a voluntary tax. Id. at 26.
21. Id. at 12.
22. Id. at31.
23. Lee v. City of Miami, 163 So. 486, 489 (Fla. 1935).
24. See Rychlak, supra note 17, at 32. This movement was part of the "general social reform
that included movements for temperance, peace, women's rights, educational reform, prison
reform and abolition of slavery." Id.
25. Id. Examples of the social problems attributed to gambling included the following:
addiction, poverty, disintegration of families, crime, depression, and even suicide. Id. at 32-35.
26.Id. at 36-37. The constitutional provision read: "No lottery shall hereafterbe authorized
in this State; and the legislature shall pass laws to prevent the sale of all lottery tickets within this
State, except in lotteries already provided by law." Id. at 36 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 11
(1821), reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DocuMEms OF UNrrED STATES CONSTrrurioNs 188 (W.
Swindler ed., 1979)).
27. Id at 37-38. The three states were Missouri, Kentucky, and Delaware. Id.
28. Id. at 44. The one notable exception being the Louisiana Lottery, also known as "The
[Vol. 49:549
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Starting in the 1960s, lotteries began to reemerge as a popular mechanism
for raising state revenues without increasing taxes. 29 This reemergence resulted
in a domino effect from state to state. As one state amended its constitution to
allow for a state-run lottery, neighboring states followed suit fearing a loss of
potential revenues from the neighboring lottery.3" In the context of increased
competition, some states have recently experimented with video lotteries.3' The
current popularity of lotteries has reopened the same troubling questions
concerning the social costs of gambling that this country struggled with more
than a century ago.32
B. History of Lotteries in South Carolina
Early in its history, South Carolina statutorily prohibited lotteries.33
Following the national trend, South Carolina added a constitutional prohibition
in 1868 ("Lottery Clause").34 Article XIV, section 2 of the South Carolina
Constitution read: "Lotteries, and the sale of lottery tickets, for any purpose
whatever, are prohibited, and the General Assembly shall prevent the same by
penal laws."35 At the 1895 Constitutional Convention, the Lottery Clause was
modified slightly and moved to Article XVII, section 7.36 The modified version
Serpent." Id. at 40. This notoriously corrupt lottery was finally eradicated after acts of Congress
in 1890 and 1895. Id. at 43-44.
29. Id. at 44-45.
30. Rychlak, supra note 17, at 58-60.
31. See, e.g., Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238, 248 (S.D. 1994) (holding video lottery
an illegal "game of chance" and not covered by the South Dakota constitutional provision
allowing certain forms of lotteries).
32. See Rychlak, supra note 17, at 60; see also supra text accompanying note 25. Professor
Rychiak provides an excellent in-depth treatment of the present-day social costs of lotteries and
other state-sanctioned forms of gambling. See Rychlak, supra note 17, at 60-74.
33. Act of May 4, 1751, No. 784, 3 S.C. Stat. 729 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-19-10 to -20 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997)) (prohibiting the setting up and adventuring
in lotteries). The preamble of the 1751 law, entitled "An Act for Suppressing and Preventing of
Private Lotterys," stated:
WHEREAS, many persons have lately, and do daily presume to setup
lotterys under the denomination of sales of houses, lands, plate, jewels,
goods, wares, merchandizes and other things, by chances, which practices
are highly prejudicial to the public and to the trade of this Province, and tend
to defraud his Majesty's subjects; we therefore pray your most sacred
Majesty that it may be enacted ....
Id. at 729.
In 1846, the General Assembly added a prohibition on the sale of lottery tickets. Act of Dec.
18,1846, No. 2983, 11 S.C. Stat. 391 (codified as amended atS.C. CoDEANN. § 16-19-30 (Law.
Co-op. 1976)).
34. See 1868 CONVENTION, supra note 1.
35. S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. XIV, § 2.
36. JOURNAL OFTHE CONSTIUTONAL CONVENTIONOFTHE STATEOF SOUTH CAROLINA 252
(Columbia, S.C., Calvo 1895) [hereinafter 1895 CONvENTION]. As with the 1868 Convention, the
1998]
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read: "No lottery shall ever be allowed, or be advertised by newspapers, or
otherwise, or its tickets be sold in this State; and the General Assembly shall
provide by law at its next session for the enforcement of this provision."'37
Finally, after a referendum on the matter passed in the 1974 general election,
the Lottery Clause was amended to permit the game of bingo under certain
circumstances. 8 Today, the Lottery Clause reads:
No lottery shall ever be allowed or be advertised by newspapers,
or otherwise, or its tickets be sold in this State. The game of bingo,
when conducted by charitable, religious or fraternal organizations
exempt from federal income taxation or when conducted at recognized
annual State and county fairs, shall not be deemed a lottery prohibited
by this section.39
C. Interpretation of the Lottery Clause
One of the earliest cases discussing South Carolina's lottery prohibition is
a pre-Lottery Clause case decided in 1818. In State v. Pinchback" the South
Carolina Supreme Court took the opportunity to interpret the Lottery Act of
1762,41 which was the precursor to the constitutional prohibition on lotteries.4"
The court held that a raffle of watches did not constitute a lottery as it
understood the meaning of the term "lottery." 3 The court narrowly construed
the type of activities that would qualify as a lottery, essentially classifying a
lottery as a strict subclass of the larger class of gambling in general.' While the
delegates of 1895 adopted the new version of the Lottery Clause without any debate. Id. at 287.
37. S.C. CONST. of 1895, art. XVH, § 7.
38. See Act of Mar. 11, 1975, No. 43, 1975 S.C. Acts 45.
39. S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 7.
40. 4 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 33 (1818).
41. Id. The Lottery Act of 1762 contained essentially the same language as the 1751 act
prohibiting lotteries. Id.; see supra note 33.
42.7 S.C. JuRispuDENcEGaming § 2, at 190 (1991) ("[Tihe Lottery Act, which has existed
since 1762... was made a part of the state constitution of 1868.").
43. Pinchback, 4 S.C.L. (2 Mill) at 34.
44. Id. The court noted:
The term lotteries, as used in the act, appears to me to be a term of art, for
if otherwise it may mean any thing, as in common parlance it is applied to
one half of the ordinary occurrences or accidents of life. If, then, it be a term
of art, and it is to be applied to the class to which it belongs, it embraces
only one class of adventures or hazards, the grand schemes of which our
newspapers daily exhibit. I do not mean by this that a lottery cannot exist
without this formality and publicity, but I mean only to say that there may
be an adventure or hazard without a lottery; every throw of the die, even for
an ordinary wager, is an adventure or hazard, and I am sure it never yet
entered the mind of any man that it constituted a lottery.
[Vol. 49:549
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court was clear on what did not constitute a lottery, it was less than clear on an
affirmative definition of the term.45 Such definitional clarity would have to wait
until 1939.
Darlington Theatres, Inc. v. Coker4 contains the South Carolina Supreme
Court's most extensive discussion of the Lottery Clause, and so provides the
groundwork upon which the issue of video poker may ultimately be decided.
In Darlington Theatres the court held that a local theater's practice of drawing
names for a cash prize was not a lottery. 7 The court defined a lottery in terms
of three essential elements: "(1) The giving of a prize, (2) by a method
involving chance, (3) for a consideration paid by the contestant or
participant."'48 All three elements must be present for a lottery to exist.49
Because the theater's promotional scheme did not require the purchase of a
ticket, consideration was lacking and thus the raffle was not a lottery." While
the court's three-element test seemed to state clearly a rather broad definition
of lotteries for future application, much of the court's language was reminiscent
of the narrower construction seen in the Pinchback decision.5 This apparent
inconsistency is examined in Part V of this Comment.
Controversy over the Lottery Clause resurfaced in the 1970s amid
questions concerning the constitutionality of the game of bingo. After the South
Carolina Attorney General issued an opinion in 1970 declaring bingo an illegal
45. In short, Pinchback leaves us with no more of a definition than did Justice Potter Stewart
in his reference to hard-core pornography: "IknowitwhenI see it...."Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concuning).
46. 190 S.C. 282,2 S.E.2d 782 (1939).
47. Id. at 296, 2 S.E.2d at 788. In Darlington Theatres the supreme court affirmed and
reported the circuit court's order. Id. at 283-97, 2 S.E.2d at 782-88.
48. Id. at 291, 2 S.E.2d at 786 (emphasis added). The court went on to quote definitions of
the term "lottery" found in dictionaries and case law to support its construction of the term. Id.
at 291-93, 2 S.E.2d at 786-87; see also FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284, 290 (1954) (utilizing the
same three-element test to define what constitutes a lottery).
49. Darlington Theatres, 190 S.C. at 291, 2 S.E.2d at 786.
50. Id. at 296, 2 S.E.2d at 788. Had the theater required the purchase of anything to
participate in the drawing, irrespective of whether it was for a ticket or not, then the requisite
consideration would have been present and the scheme deemed a lottery. Id. at 289-90, 2 S.E.2d
at 785.
51. This language is worth noting at some length:
In other words, it seems to me that the statute [prohibiting lotteries]
will not bear the construction that any scheme that involves an element of
chance comes within the prohibition .... The statute is undoubtedly
directed at a particular type of gaming or gambling which has become
commonly known as a lottery, and not the prohibition of games of chance
of all kinds.... [I]t is apparent that the constitutional and legislative
prohibition is directed at a special type of vice...--the type that has come
to be denominated both in the law and in common parlance by the word
lottery.
Id at 290, 2 S.E.2d at 785-86 (emphasis added).
1998]
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lottery,52 South Carolina passed a constitutional amendment in 1975 carving out
an exception to the lottery prohibition for certain types of bingo. 3 The South
Carolina Supreme Court subsequently endorsed the opinion of the Attorney
General by stating that bingo had been illegal lottery up until the passage of the
1975 amendment.5 4 In short, South Carolina has generally accepted with little
resistance that the game of bingo is, and always has been, a lottery.
Judicial application of the Lottery Clause to video poker is sparse.
Opinions of the Attorney General have taken a consistent stand that video
poker is a lottery under the three-element test in Darlington Theatres and is
therefore unconstitutional." Several circuit court rulings agree with the
Attorney General.56 Unfortunately, the reasoning in each of these decisions is
conclusory and sheds little light on the rationale behind the rulings." In the two
cases that were appealed, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower
courts on grounds unrelated to the lottery question." The supreme court stated
in each opinion that it need not address the lottery question because the lower
courts erred in addressing the matter.5 9 Thus, whether video poker is a lottery
presents a matter of first impression for the state's highest court.
52. 1970 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 3064, at 361. The Attorney General opined that the game
of bingo was an illegal lottery even when the proceeds are donated to charitable organizations. Id.
53. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
54. Army Navy Bingo, Garrison#2196 v. Plowden, 281 S.C. 226, 228,314 S.E.2d 339,340
(1984) ("Bingo is a lottery, and it is gambling."); Bingo Bank, Inc. v. Strom, 268 S.C. 498,502,
234 S.E.2d 881, 883 (1977).
55. See 1994 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 94-21, at 51; 1993 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 93-19, at
50.
56. Ardis v. Ward, No. 93-CP-24-152, slip op. (S.C. Ct. C.P. Greenwood County, July 6,
1994) (action to recover video poker losses under S.C. Code Ann. § 32-1-20 dismissed because
the gambling contract was unenforceable as an illegal lottery); Montjoy v. One Stop ofAbbeville,
Inc., No. 93-CP-01-73, slip op. (S.C. Ct. C.P. Abbeville County, July 6, 1994) (action to recover
video poker losses under S.C. Code Ann. § 32-1-20 dismissed because the gambling contract was
unenforceable as an illegal lottery); Bagwell v. Tollison, No. 91-CP-04-1784, slip op. (S.C. Ct.
C.P. Anderson County, Aug. 24, 1993) (action to recover $250,000 in video poker winnings
dismissed because the gambling contract was unenforceable as an illegal lottery). Interestingly,
the video poker industry argued that video poker was an unconstitutional lottery to get each of
these cases dismissed.
57. The analysis in each case incorporates the exact same language: "The participant puts
a quarter in the machine which is consideration, then wins or loses by chance, and is then paid for
free games accumulated which is a prize." Ardis, slip op. at 7; Montyoy, slip op. at 7; Bagwell,
slip op. at 4. Besides reciting the Darlington Theatres three-element test, this language is the
extent of the legal analysis utilized by these courts in interpreting the Lottery Clause.
58. Montjoy v. One Stop of Abbeville, Inc., 325 S.C. 17, 478 S.E.2d 683 (1996) (reversing
the lower court on the grounds that no contractual claim was at issue and thus dismissal was in
error); Ardis v. Ward, 321 S.C. 65, 467 S.E.2d 742 (1996) (reversing the lower court on the
grounds that no contractual claim was at issue and thus dismissal was in error). No appeal was
filed in Bagwell.
59. Montjoy, 325 S.C. at 19, 478 S.E.2d at 684; Ardis, 321 S.C. at 70, 467 S.E.2d at 745.
[Vol. 49:549
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111. VIDEO POKER
A. Evolution ofElectronic Gambling
The origins of mechanical and electronic gambling devices can be traced
back to the invention of the slot machine in 1887.' The popularity of these
"one-armed bandits" quickly grew, finding their way into almost every
community in the country by 1910.61 The majority of states responded rather
quickly by passing laws banning slot machines.62 Because the Darlington
Theatres's three-element test for lotteries is also the standard by which
gambling in general is measured,63 these slot machines unquestionably
constituted gambling and, thus, were subject to state regulation.' While many
slot machine owners attempted to modify their machines to elude these laws,
the devices declined in popularity by mid-century.6" In their place stepped
pinball machines fitted with free replay features.' Rather than offering cash as
its prize, these machines offered free replays awarding the player extended
playing time on the machine.67 As such, many states viewed these pinball
machines as forms of entertainment rather than gambling, because no prize of
value was being offered.6" The introduction of "knock-off' switches and
meters, however, clearly transformed the pinball machine into a gambling
device.69 These additions allowed the player to receive cash for the accumulated
free plays from the pinball machine operator.7 ° Once again, however, state
60. Ronald J. Rychlak, Video Gambling Devices, 37 UCLAL. REv. 555, 559 (1990). The
inventor was Charles Fey of San Francisco. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 560-61.
63. Id. at 556. Because lotteries and gambling are identically defined, this definition presents
difficulties when attempting to distinguish between the two. This problem is discussed in Part V
of this Comment.
64. Id. at 559.
65. Id. at 563, 566.
66. Rychlak, supra note 60, at 563.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 563-64. Other states departed from this reasoning by considering the free plays a
reward of value and thus the machines were classified as gambling devices. Id. South Carolina
followed this reasoning in Alexander v. Hunnicutt, 196 S.C. 364, 13 S.E.2d 630 (1941).
69. Rychlak, supra note 60, at 564-65.
70. Id. Professor Rychlak described the normal procedure as follows:
When the player wants to "cash-in," he or she goes to the proprietor. The
size of the payout will depend on the number of replays registered on the
machine. The proprietor then flips the knock-off switch, which erases the
free replays from the machine. The meter records the number of free replays
that have been erased or"knocked-off." The machine owner/operator, on a
regularly scheduled trip to the location, checks the meter and, from the
money in the machine coin box, reimburses the proprietor for all payouts
made. Any remaining profits in the coin box are then split between the
proprietor and the operator. The operator and the proprietor are thus left in
1998]
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gambling legislation curtailed the spread of these gambling machines.7'
With the introduction of video games for entertainment purposes in 1977,
the gambling industry found yet another tool to market its product.' Video
gambling devices are usually referred to as "video poker" or "video lottery" in
the various states that permit them.73 Essentially, these video machines
replicate common forms of gambling, such as "poker, blackjack, craps, and
horse racing."'74 Players accumulate credits as they win and are able to redeem
these credits for cash with the video poker operator.75 In addition, apre-set pay-
out percentage is programmed into each machine.76 In South Carolina, a video
poker machine is defined as
an electronic video games machine that, upon insertion of cash, is
available to play or simulate the play of games as authorized by the
[South Carolina Tax C]ommission utilizing a video display and
microprocessors in which the player may receive free games or credits
that can be redeemed for cash.
77
The South Carolina General Assembly has responded to the popularity of these
machines by statutorily allowing video poker machines, and the Department of
Revenue has promulgated regulations to control their proper operation.
B. The South Carolina Statutory Framework
South Carolina has historically adhered to an anti-gambling policy in its
statutory code.78 The current statutory prohibitions are codified in sections 16-
19-10 through 16-19-160 of the South Carolina Code. 79 These sections, dating
as far back as 1802,80 specifically ban almost every type of gambling
imaginable and carry criminal penalties for violations.8 ' Additionally, code
the same position as if the machine itself had made payments to the
successful player.
Id. (footnote omitted).
71. Id. at 566.
72. Atari Corporation introduced the first video game into the marketplace that year. Id.
73. Forpurposes of simplicity, this Commentwill refer to these machines generally as "video
poker" unless this description is clearly inappropriate.
74. Rychlak, supra note 60, at 566.
75. Id. at 567-68. Video poker machines, like pinball machines, are fitted with knock-off
switches and meters to allow for the cashing-out of credits. Id. at 568; see supra note 70.
76. Rychlak, supra note 60, at 570; see infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-2772(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
78. 7 S.C. JUISPRUDENCE Gaming § 2 (1991).
79. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 16-19-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997).
80. Act of Dec. 18, 1802, No. 1786, 5 S.C. Stat. 432 (codified as amended at S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-19-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997)).
81. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 16-19-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997).
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sections 32-1-10 and 32-1-20, dating back to 1712,82 allow gamblers to bring
civil actions to recover losses exceeding fifty dollars.83 Moreover, a provision
in the state constitution prohibits "any person holding an office of honor, trust
or profit" from engaging in gambling or suffer removal from office.84
South Carolina has two exceptions to the general constitutional and
statutory policy against gambling.85 First, a constitutional exception permits
certain forms of bingo.86 Second, a statutory exception protects the type of
video poker machine described earlier.8 7 Section 16-19-60 of the South
Carolina Code legalizes "coin-operated nonpayout machines with a free play
feature" as long as the machine itself does not "disburse[] money to the
player."88 Thus, a video poker machine that allows a player to accumulate
credits and cash out with the machine operator fits within the statutory
exception.89 In 1993, the South Carolina General Assembly passed the Video
Game Machines Act (VGMA), which established guidelines for the licensing
and operation of video poker machines.' These statutes include a maximum
payout limit of $125 per player" and a maximum of five machines at any one
place or premises.'
82. Act of Dec. 12, 1712, 2 S.C. Stat. 565-68.
83. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 32-1-10 to -20 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
84. S.C. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 8. This section was adopted at the 1895 Constitutional
Convention without debate simultaneously with section 7 (the Lottery Clause). See 1895
CONVENTION, supra note 36, at 287.
85. 7 S.C. JURISPRUDENCE Gaming § 2 (1991). In addition to these two exceptions, which
address the particularform of gambling involved, there are two time and place exceptions to the
general statutory policy prohibiting gambling. Section 52-1-20 allows "games of chance involving
skill" at state and county fairs. S.C. CODEANN. § 52-1-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Section 61-2-180
allows bingo and raffles at special events intended to raise funds for charitable purposes. S.C.
CODEANN. § 61-2-180 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
86. S.C. CONsT. art. XVII, § 7; see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
87. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-19-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); see supra notes 74-77 and
accompanying text.
88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-19-60. This section was amended in 1986. See Act No. 540, Part
I, § 26B, 1986 S.C. Acts 4898,4900. Prior to 1986, only machines that did not disburse "money
or property" to the player were covered by the exception. The 1986 amendment deleted the words
"or property." For an eye-opening account of how this amendment made its way through the
General Assembly, see Cindi Ross Scoppe, JackLindsay's Worst Trick Wasn't Capital Gains Tax
Cut, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 4, 1998, at A10.
89. See State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 274, 403 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991) (stating that
video poker machines that do not directly disburse money to the player are legal under section 16-
19-60, even when the player is able to cash-in game credits with the machine operator).
90. Act No. 164, Part II, § 19,1993 S.C. Acts 1130 (codified at S.C. CODEANN. §§ 12-21-
2770 to -2809 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997)).
91. S.C. CODEANN. § 12-21-2791 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
92. S.C. CODEANN. § 12-21-2804 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
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C. Video Poker Case Law
South Carolina courts have consistently held that slot and pinball machines,
the precursors to video poker, are prohibited forms of gambling. 3 Interestingly,
these courts did not entertain the issue of whether these mechanical gambling
devices constituted a lottery, but rather chose to rely exclusively upon statutes
prohibiting gambling activities.94 In two recent cases, the supreme court
continued this trend by holding that slot machines with video displays are not
covered by the statutory exception legalizing video poker and thus constitute
illegal gambling."5
The leading case construing the legality of video poker is State v.
Blackmon.96 InBlackmon the court held that coin-operated nonpayout machines
with free play features fall within the exception of section 16-19-60 and thus
are not statutorily illegal forms of gamblingY The court held these machines
legal even when the player is able to cash-in accumulated credits with the
machine owner.9 The ruling in Blackmon means that any successful attack on
the legality of video poker must come from either the state constitution or from
legislative modification of the current statutory law.
The South Carolina Supreme Court also dealt with the issue of video poker
in Powell v. Red Carpet Lounge.' While the Powell court applied section 16-
19-60 to find video poker machines legal, the court went on to hold that the
existence and possession of the machines did not violate the South Carolina
Constitution." ° "A lottery[,] as contemplated by the constitution, simply is not
involved."'' However, the court did not address the issue of whether the use
93. See Holliday v. Governor of South Carolina, 78 F. Supp. 918, 922 (W.D.S.C. 1948)
(citing several older South Carolina Supreme Court decisions holding pinball machines with free
play features illegal gambling devices).
94. Id. The South Carolina Attorney General has consistently opined that pinball machines
that allow aplayerto cash in accumulated free plays are unconstitutional lotteries. See, e.g., 1973
Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 3544, at 181.
95. See, e.g., State v. One Coin-Operated Video Game Mach., 321 S.C. 176,181,467 S.E.2d
443, 446 (1996) (finding the "Cherry Master" video-simulated slot machine an illegal gambling
device); State v. Four Video SlotMachs., 317 S.C. 397,400,453 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1995) (finding
the "Lucky 8 Line" video-simulated slot machine an illegal gambling device).
96. 304 S.C. 270,403 S.E.2d 660 (1991).
97. Id. at 274, 403 S.E.2d at 662.
98. Id. at 273-74,403 S.E.2d at 661-62. Butsee 1994 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 94-21, at 51,
52n.1 ("To the extent that [the VGMA] purports to authorize constitutionally proscribed lotteries,
the Act is unconstitutional."); 1993 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 93-19, at 50 (arguing that the
cashing-in ofaccumulated credits on video pokermachines makes them unconstitutional lotteries).
99. 280 S.C. 142, 311 S.E.2d 719 (1984) (upholdingthe legality ofthe video pokermachines
"Draw Poker," "Black Jack," and "Bally Double Up").
100. The court noted that neither sections 7 or 8 of Article XVII were violated in this case.
Id. at 146, 311 S.E.2d at 721.
101. Id. The court went on to state: "Argument to the effect that these are gambling
machines prohibited under the lottery provisions of the constitution because elements of chance
[Vol. 49:549
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of these machines for gambling purposes would constitute a lottery under the
constitution."° To date, that issue remains unresolved in South Carolina.
IV. IS VIDEO POKER A LOTTERY?
As the above discussion illustrates, the answer to this Part's question is not
readily apparent from South Carolina jurisprudence. 3 The South Carolina
Supreme Court has yet to apply the Darlington Theatres three-element test to
video poker, or to any other comparable mechanical or electronic gambling
device. With the question now squarely before the supreme court, the
experience of other states with this issue is instructive. While only a few state
appellate courts have dealt with the precise question of whether video poker
machines or similar electronic gaming devices constitute lotteries, a substantial
number have discussed the meaning of their constitutional lottery prohibitions
as applied to various forms of gambling.
A. The Conventional'Approach
The majority of state courts, as well as the United States Supreme Court,"°
agree with South Carolina that a lottery is defined by three essential elements:
(1) consideration, (2) chance, and (3) prize.0 5 "Consideration is the stake,
wager, or bet that gamblers risk losing if they are unsuccessful."'" In the
context of video poker, the money deposited into the machine by the player
constitutes consideration. 7 Because a player must deposit money into the
machine to begin play, consideration is the easiest of the three elements to
establish.' Likewise, the element of prize is rather simple to ascertain." A
prize is something of value, usually money or property, which the player seeks
to obtain by participating in the game."0 A video poker machine registers a
and skill are involved is without merit." Id.
102. Id.
103. See Order of Certification, supra note 5, at 2 ("IThere appears to be no controlling
precedent in the decisions of the [South Carolina] Supreme Court.").
104. FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284,290 (1954).
105. See, e.g., 38 AM. JuR. 2D Gambling § 6 (1968) (providing a list of these states and
citations to corresponding case law); see also Rychlak, supra note 17, at 14.
106. Rychlak, supra note 60, at 556.
107. To avoid violating state lottery prohibitions, privately run contests and sweepstakes,
such as those found at fast-food establishments like McDonalds, do not require a purchase of any
kind to participate. See Rychlak, supra note 17, at 14-15.
108. Apparently, the defendants in the Johnson case do not dispute the element of
consideration. See Order of Certification, supra note 5 (discussing the element of chance as the
disputed issue between the parties).
109. As with the element of consideration, it appears the parties in the Johnson case agree
that video poker offers a prize. See Order of Certification, supra note 5.
110. See BLACK'S LAW DICrONARY 1200 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of "prize"); Rychlak,
19981
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running total of free replays or credits during the course of a player's time spent
on the machine.' When a winning player chooses to discontinue playing, the
machine distributes a credit slip, which the machine operator redeems for
cash."' Because the credit slip represents a right to receive cash, it holds value
and thus constitutes a prize.1
Chance is the critical factor in determining whether video poker is a
lottery.1 4 Generally, chance is defined as a lack of control over events or an
uncertainty as to the occurrence of those events."' In other words, chance is
present when we lack the means by which to effect a desired outcome (these
"means" can be described as "skill"). While the definition of chance is
generally understood and accepted, its judicial application is not."6 The
problem presents itself as one of degree rather than kind. For what human
conduct or action does not involve at least some degree of uncertainty as to its
ultimate outcome and consequences? Obviously, a measure of both skill and
chance coexist in most human activities." 7 Many state courts have dealt with
this problem within the context of lotteries and gambling devices by measuring
the degree of chance involved in a particular game and then applying one of
supra note 60, at 558.
111. Id. at 567-68.
112.Id.
113. Id. at 558. Most states agree that free replays inherently do not represent something of
value constituting a prize. However, when these replays can be redeemed for cash, the prize
element does emerge. Id. at 563-64. See, e.g., Games Management, Inc. v. Owens, 662 P.2d 260,
263 (Kan. 1983) ("[We hold a machine offering only free replays as a prize does not offer
'something of value' and is therefore not a gambling device... ."); Commonwealth v. Two Elec.
Poker Game Machs., 465 A.2d 973, 978 (Pa. 1983) (holding the presence of knock-off switches
and meters on video poker devices, which allow free credits to be cashed in, satisfy the prize
element). State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E.2d 660 (1991), may be distinguished. The
Blackmon court simply held that video poker machines which do not directly disburse money to
the player qualify for the statutory exception under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-19-60 and are thus
deemed legal. Id. at 274, 403 S.E.2d at 662. The court did not consider whether the credit slip
constituted a valuable prize.
The lack of prize is one ofthe key distinctions between video gambling devices such as video
poker and entertainment video games such as "Pac-Man." In essence, the winning of free games
on"Pac-Man" is of de minimis value to the player and therefore cannot properly be characterized
as a prize. See Rychlak, supra note 60, at 564. But see Holliday v. Governor of South Carolina,
78 F. Supp. 918, 922 (W.D.S.C. 1948) (recognizing the continued amusement provided by a free
play on a pinball machine as something of value constituting a reward). However, in the fifty
years since Holliday, the Attorney General has opined that free plays do not inherently constitute
something of value. See, e.g., 1973 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 3544, at 181 ("A pinball machine
would constitute a lottery if a prize were offered or cash consideration were offered as a prize.").
114. Not surprisingly, it is also the most difficult to establish. Rychlak, supra note 60, at
556.
115. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990) (definition of "chance").
116. See I. NELsON RosE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 79 (1986).
117. Id. at 79-80 (demonstrating that the "skill" game of chess involves a degree of chance,
and the "chance" game of roulette involves a degree of skill).
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss3/8
VIDEO POKER AND THE LOTTERY CLAUSE
two recognized standards to determine if the chance element is satisfied."'
B. The American and English Rules
The majority of states adhere to the American rule, which holds that the
element of chance is satisfied when chance is the "dominant" factor in
determining the results of the game."9 As long as chance predominates over
skill, the American rule is met-regardless of whether a lesser degree of skill
is also present in the game.'20 A state's selection of the American rule is usually
fatal to the party arguing the game in question is not a lottery. This is so
because chance predominates over skill in almost all gambling activities,'2 and
even in other activities outside the gambling arena.'" Not surprisingly, courts
applying the American rule to video gambling devices have determined them
to be games of chance."
A second standard, referred to as the English rule, is available to states
attempting to ascertain the chance element. 24 The English Rule requires that
skill play no part in the player's resultant success or failure." "In other words,
as long as some degree of skill is required in a gambling activity, that activity
differs from a lottery in kind, rather than in degree. In such a case, the issue is
not the degree of skill involved, but whether some skill is involved."' 26
Although the party arguing against a lottery classification for gambling devices
such as video poker would certainly advocate the adoption of the English rule,
it is unclear whether its application would necessarily result in a favorable
118. These two standards are not universally applied by states because not all states define
lotteries strictly by the conventional three-element test of consideration, chance, and prize. A
minority of states, discussed in Part V of this Comment, adhere to a stricter definition of the term
that places less emphasis on the relationship between chance and skill.
119. Morrow v. State, 511 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1973); 1961 Op. S.C. Att'y Gen. No.
1086, at 157; Rychlak, supra note 60, at 557.
120. Morrow, 511 P.2d at 129.
121. As mentioned earlier, the element of chance defines not only lotteries, but also gambling
in general. See Rychlak, supra note 60, at 556.
122. The broad reach of the American rule is demonstrated by applying its standard to the
stock market. Arguably, success in "playing the market" is predominately governed by chance,
regardless of how much skill a broker or investor may claim to possess. Is it then a lottery? Does
this comport with common sense? See infra Part V.
123. See United States v. Marder, 48 F.3d 564 (1st Cir. 1995); Score Family Fun Ctr., Inc.
v. County of San Diego, 275 Cal. Rptr. 358 (Ct. App. 1990); Games Management, Inc. v. Owens,
662 P.2d 260 (Kan. 1983); Collins Coin Music Co. v. North CarolinaAlcoholic Beverage Control
Comm'n, 451 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Two Elec. Poker Game
Machs., 465 A.2d 973 (Pa. 1983).
124. See Rychlak, supra note 60, at 557.
125. See Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm'n, 869 S.W.2d 58,62 (Mo. 1994) ("No player's
choice or will has any part in the lottery's result, nor can human reason, foresight, sagacity, or
design enable a player to affect the game.").
126. Opinion of the Justices, No. 358, 692 So. 2d 107, 112 (Ala. 1997).
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decision. At least one court has described video poker devices as games of
chance involving no elements of skill, 27 and others have seriously questioned
the degree of skill involved in the games.1
2 1
C. Skill v. Chance
Two general lines of analysis have emerged from case law questioning the
level of skill involved in video poker machines 29 The first line of analysis
concentrates on the distinction between person-to-person card games and the
simulated card games on video poker machines. In the typical video poker
game,30 the machine displays five randomly selected cards."' The player must
then make a choice as to which cards to retain and which to discard in
exchange for new randomly selected cards. 32 Many machines possess an "auto
suggest" feature recommending which cards to keep and which to exchange."
Once the player makes the decision, the machine deals out the requested
number of new cards, and the player's success depends upon whether the five
remaining cards constitute a winning hand, such as "three-of-a-kind" or a
"straight."'34 In addition, some machines possess additional features that give
127. United States v. 294 Various Gambling Devices, 718 F. Supp. 1236, 1243 (W.D. Pa.
1989) ("[A]II the skill elements associated with the ordinary game of draw poker are
conspicuously absent in the video version.").
128. See Score Family Fun Ctr., Inc., 275 Cal. Rptr. at 361 ("Mhe Mini-Boy 7 [a video
poker game] ... presents the user with, at most, only an illusion of skill; it is predominately a
game of chance."); Collins Coin Music Co., 451 S.E.2d at 308 ("Mhe video game's program,
which allows only a predetermined number of winning hands, negates even [a] limited skill
element."); Two Elec. Poker Game Machs., 465 A.2d at 978 ("[H]olding, folding, bluffing and
raising have no role to play in Electro-Sport poker. Skill can improve the outcome...; it cannot
determine it.").
129. The following discussion centers on the card games, such as poker and blackjack,
available on video gambling devices. The relative levels of skill and chance in card games is
normally a disputed issue, because the player makes decisions about which cards to "hold" and
which cards to discard. However, it is rarely argued that other games such as bingo, lotto, and
keno involve any degree of skill whatsoever. Thus, applying either the American or English rule,
these latter games would constitute lotteries. See generally Order of Certification, supra note 5,
at 8-13 (making the same distinction between card games and bingo/keno/lotto games and stating
that the expert witnesses for the video poker industry even testified that this latter category of
games operated purely on chance).
130. For purposes of clarity and brevity, the video card game of poker is used to illustrate
the way in which a typical card game is played on these machines. Other card games, like
blackjack, vary slightly as to when the player makes his decisions and how frequently those
decisions are made. Id. at 10.
131. The following description of a typical video poker game is taken from Judge
Anderson's description in the Johnson case. Id.
132.Id. at9.
133. Id. at7.
134. Id. at 10. Different amounts of credits are awarded depending upon the type of winning
hand possessed by the player. Id. at 7.
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the player the option of splitting a single hand into two hands,"3 5 "insuring" a
bet,136 and "doubling-up" the credits won on the last game."'
Video poker lacks the human interaction that is critical in person-to-person
poker. Specifically, video poker does not allow a player to mentally challenge
an opponent by "bluffing" and "raising" during the progress of the game."' Nor
can a video poker player interpret the body language and facial expressions of
opponents, as any truly skilled card player would attempt to do.39 "Indeed, all
the skill elements associated with the ordinary game of draw poker are
conspicuously absent in the video version.... The player's only skill is to
recognize possible combinations and basic statistical probabilities."'40 Courts
distinguishing video poker from person-to-person poker generally come to the
conclusion that the lack of these psychological factors results in chance
predominating over skill, and thus the element of chance is satisfied under the
American rule.'4 ' Because these same courts recognize at least some marginal
degree of skill involved in choosing which cards to hold and which cards to
discard,142 the element of chance does not appear to be satisfied under the
English rule.
The second line of analysis that questions the skill involved in video poker
centers on the pre-set pay-out percentage programmed into video poker
machines. The machines are programmed to pay out a maximum percentage on
each dollar wagered based on an "optimum play model." Thus, a player using
the best possible mathematical strategy (based on the laws of statistics and
probabilities) will, on average, realize a return no greater than the pre-set
percentage.' According to testimony in the Johnson case, this percentage on
selected machines in'South Carolina ranges from ninety-five to ninety-seven
135. Order of Certification, supra note 5, at 9-10.
136. Id. at 10. Insuring a bet "cuts in half the risk of loss." Id.
137. Id.
138. See Collins Coin Music Co. v. North Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n,
451 S.E.2d 306,308 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) ("Psychology and bluffing have no effect on the final
outcome of play when playing electronic video poker.").
139. See Score Family Fun Ctr., Inc. v. County of San Diego, 275 Cal. Rptr. 358, 360 (Ct.
App. 1990).
140. United States v. 294 Various Gambling Devices, 718 F. Supp. 1236, 1243 (W.D. Pa.
1989).
141. See United States v. Marder, 48 F.3d 564,569 (1st Cir. 1995); Collins Coin Music Co.,
451 S.E.2d at 308; Commonwealth v. Two Elec. Poker Game Machs., 465 A.2d 973, 978 (Pa.
1983).
142. An expert witness for the plaintiff in the Johnson case testified to the presence of some
skill in video poker. According to FBI agent Jerome Simpson, a skilled player could increase his
chance of winning by 11/2 to 3 percent over a non-skilled player. ClifLeBlanc, Gaming Expert
Says 'Dumb Luck, Not Player Skill, Beats Machines, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 10,
1998, at B3.
143. Order of Certification, supra note 5, at 7.
144. Id. at 7-8.
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percent of a player's total wager. 14' As a result, even the best player, over time,
will not succeed in winning more money at video poker than the player
wagered.
1 46
Courts that focus on the pre-set pay-out percentage question whether any
skill, even the skill involved in holding and discarding cards based on basic
statistical probabilities, is recognizable inthe face oftheunderlying pre-setpay-
out percentage. As the North Carolina Court of Appeals recently stated,
"[A]Ithough a player's knowledge of statistical probabilities can maximize his
winnings in the short term, .... [i]n the long run, the video game's program,
which allows only a predetermined number ofwinning hands, negates even this
limited skill element."'47 The question whether to.recognize skill in the face of
the pre-set pay-out percentage is critical, particularly when a court chooses to
apply the English rule to the element of chance. 41 Even if an initial degree of
skill is acknowledged in the playing of an individual game, does the machine's
computer program setting a maximum average pay-out negate this skill for
purposes of determining whether a lottery exists? The answer to this question
is not clear from a survey of other state case law.
The Darlington Theatres three-element test is the conventional approach
most states use when determining whether a particular game or activity
145. Id. at 8 n.6.
146. However, a player, skilled or unskilled, may win sums in excess of the wager in the
short run. The machine's pre-set percentage sets a maximum pay out on average. The longer a
person plays a video poker machine, the closer the results will mirror the pre-set percentage. Id.
at 17-18. Professors Haynesworth and Morris illustrated this point in a recently published
editorial. Toby Haynsworth & Dick Morris, Video Poker Needs Better Odds, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 10, 1998, at A9 ("As long as the payback is less than 100 percent, the
machine will relieve the player of every last cent he has if he plays the game long enough.").
147. Collins Coin Music Co. v. North Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 451
S.E.2d 306, 308 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). As in the Johnson case, representatives
of the video poker industry presented expert testimony from mathematicians and statisticians to
the effect that video poker is primarily a game of skill. Id. The North Carolina court refused to
accept this testimony and ruled that the machines were primarily games of chance. Id. at 309.
Experts for the defendants in the Johnson case testified that, based on mathematical models,
the video poker player with the "absolute maximum skill" enjoys a significantly higher winning
percentage than a fellow "totally unskilled" player. Order of Certification, supra note 5, at 16.
However, as Judge Anderson points out, "optimum play in this form is more theoretical than
realistic[,] . . . requir[ing] extensive time and mathematical skills (or an appropriately
programmed computer) to properly evaluate the various options." Id. at 17; cf Morrow v. State,
511 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1973) ("'Whether chance or skill was the determining factor in the
contest must depend upon the capacity of the general public-not experts--o solve the problems
presented."' (quoting McKittrick v. Globe-Democrat Publ'g Co., 110 S.W.2d 705, 711 (Mo.
1937))).
148. As the discussion of the first line of analysis demonstrated, the American rule of chance
is satisfied by distinguishing between person-to-person poker and video simulated poker. Thus,
the further analysis involving pre-set pay-out percentages will not change, but only reinforce, the
American rule's determination that video poker satisfies the chance element of a lottery.
Vol. 49:549
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constitutes a lottery.'49 Applied to video poker, the conventional approach
yields mixed results depending upon which standard is applied to the chance
element. Under the broad umbrella of the American rule, video poker is
properly classified as a lottery. However, under the less expansive reach of the
English rule, the question remains unresolved. As a result, the legality of video
poker may be in serious jeopardy if the three-element test is applied in South
Carolina.' °
V. DOES THIS MAKE SENSE?: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
A. The Logical Inconsistency of the Conventional Approach
Whether the American or English rule is applied, the results of the
Darlington Theatres three-element test cannot be reconciled with the historical
and common sense meaning of the term "lottery."'' This conflict may come
from the use of the same test to distinguish a lottery from other activities and
to define "gambling" and "games of chance" in general." 2 "Lottery, when
defined solely by consideration, chance, and prize, sweeps too broadly and does
not distinguish between lotteries and other forms of gambling."'53 The
application of the three-element test, particularly when the American rule
determines the chance element, results in most (if not all) gambling activities
being labeled as lotteries."s4 This result contradicts South Carolina's
constitutional, statutory, and common law history.
Lotteries are a "species" or subset contained within the larger sphere of
gambling in general. 55 Whereas all lotteries are necessarily forms of gambling,
not all forms of gambling are properly characterized as lotteries.'56 Indeed, the
149. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
150. This fact may explain why the defendants in the Johnson case argue that the South
Carolina Supreme Court should reject the three-element test in favor of a more restricted historical
definition of lotteries. Order of Certification, supra note 5, at 4.
151. See Darlington Theatres, Inc. v. Coker, 190 S.C. 282, 292, 2 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1939)
("The word 'lottery' it has been held, has no technical, legal meaning but must be construed in
the popular sense.").
152. See Rosa, supra note 116, at 75; Rychlak, supra note 17, at 14; Rychlak, supra note
60, at 556.
153. Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm'n, 869 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Mo. 1994).
154. Professor Santoni has noted: "Those familiar with traditional forms of gaming know
that prize, chance, and consideration are the three characteristics common to all forms of gaming.
Therefore, this definition of the term 'lottery' makes all forms of gaming prohibited lotteries."
Roland J. Santoni, An Introduction to Nebraska GamingLaw, 29 CREiHToN L. REV. 1123,1129
(1996) (footnote omitted).
155. See Darlington Theatres, 190 S.C. at 291, 2 S.E.2d at 786 (referring to the term
"lottery" as a "species of gaming").
156. See 9 S.C. JuJSPRUrDENCE Lotteries § 3 (1992) ("The term 'gambling' is broader and
encompasses more activities than the term 'lottery.' Therefore, it can be said that a lottery is
always gambling, whereas gambling is not always a lottery.") (footnote omitted).
1998]
19
Eisenrauch: Video Poker and the Lottery Clause: Where Common Law and Common S
Published by Scholar Commons, 1998
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
distinction between lotteries and games of chance is found within the South
Carolina Constitution. As discussed in Part II of this Comment, Article XVII,
Section 7 prohibits lotteries.1 7 Section 8 of the same Article prohibits specified
office holders from engaging "in gambling or betting on games of chance."'5 8
Any argument suggesting the delegates to the 1895 Constitutional Convention
simply overlooked the relationship between the two sections is extinguished
when the official convention journal is reviewed.' 9 Sections 7 and 8 were
passed at the very same time on September 30, 1895."6 Apparently, the framers
of the South Carolina Constitution rejected the very results reached by the
conventional three-element test-that lotteries and games of chance are the
same.
In Poppen v. Walker' the South Dakota Supreme Court recently came to
a similar conclusion regarding its own constitutional lottery prohibition. The
court held that "video lottery" machines" were not lotteries as defined by the
South Dakota Constitution. In doing so, the court identified two different
kinds of state lottery prohibitions around the country.'" When state
constitutions only prohibit lotteries, the courts of those states have broadly
interpreted the prohibition in accordance with the conventional three-element
test.165 In contrast, when the state constitution prohibits lotteries and games of
chance, courts have narrowly construed the former as "contemplating the sale
of tokens or tickets to large numbers of people for the chance to share in the
distribution of prizes for the purpose of raising public revenue."'" At least
according to South Dakota's analysis, South Carolina falls into this second tier
of states narrowly defining lotteries. 67
157. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
158. S.C. CONsT. art. XVII, § 8.
159. See supra note 36.
160. 1895 CONVENTION, supra note 36, at 287. Section 8 (originally adopted as section 9)
passed as an entirely new amendment, while Section 7 passed as a modification from its earlier
form in the 1868 Constitution. Id.
161.520 N.W.2d 238 (S.D. 1994).
162. According to the description of these machines in the opinion, video lottery machines
appear very similar to the types of video poker machines found in South Carolina. Id. at 240-41.
163. Id. at 248.
164. Id. at 244.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 245.
167. An argument can be made, however, distinguishing Poppen on grounds that the
distinction between lotteries and games of chance is made within the same section of the South
Dakota Constitution, while the distinction is accomplished by separate sections in the South
Carolina Constitution. Compare S.D. CONST. art. I, § 25 ("The Legislature shall not authorize
any game of chance, lottery or gift enterprise... :.), with S.C. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 7 ("No lottery
shall ever be allowed... in this State ... ."), and S.C. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 8 ("It shall be
unlawful for any person holding an office of honor, trust or profit to engage in gambling or betting
on games of chance .... ."). But see Poppen, 520 S.W.2d at 244 ("When a constitution prohibits
both games of chance and lotteries, the question arises as to the distinction between the two terms.
[Vol. 49:549
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South Carolina's statutory framework also clearly distinguishes between
lotteries and other forms of gambling. Sections 16-19-10 through 16-19-30
prohibit the "setting up" of, "adventuring in," and "selling" of tickets for
lotteries. 168 The very next set of laws, sections 16-19-40 through 16-19-160,
prohibit various forms of gambling and betting.169 When considering that these
statutory prohibitions on lotteries and gambling pre-date the passage of the
Lottery Clause in 1868,170 the distinction is magnified. If all gambling activities
are defined as lotteries by the conventional three-element test, then why has the
General Assembly continued to prohibit lotteries and gambling separately?
Several states possessing similar statutory histories regarding separate
lottery and gambling prohibitions clearly distinguish between the two terms. In
Lee v. City ofMiami' the Florida Supreme Court noted the state's statutory
framework and concluded that Florida's lottery clause specifically applied to
the type of state-chartered lotteries popular in this country up until the mid-
1800s.2 The court in Lee refused to adopt a broad "generic" definition of the
term. " The Ohio Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion after reviewing
its legislative history." Having determined that Ohio's lottery clause
specifically prohibited the classic "ticket" lottery,'75 the Mills-Jennings court
went on to state: "It was only because the legislatures had seen fit to employ
the scheme of a lottery for public and private purposes that the people
considered it necessary to prohibit lotteries in the Constitution."'76
Perhaps the clearest distinction between lotteries and other types of
gambling derives from the opinions of the South Carolina Supreme Court.
Ironically, a limited conception of the term "lottery" is found in the very case
that first invoked the conventional three-element test in this state.'" The
Darlington Theatres court refers to the lottery prohibition as remedying "a
special type of vice" and not meant to be a "prohibition of games of chance of
all kinds."'78 Moreover, this restricted definition of lotteries is consistent with
When both terms are used, the term 'lottery' has a narrower meaning in that it is a special form
of game of chance.") (emphasis added).
168. S.C. CoDn-ANN. §§ 16-19-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997).
169. S.C. CODEANN. §§ 16-19-40 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997). As mentioned
earlier, section 16-19-60 creates an exception to the general prohibition on gambling for video
poker machines. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
170. The lottery statutes date back to 1751. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. The
general gambling statutes date back to 1802. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
171. 163 So. 486 (Fla. 1935).
172. Id. at 489; see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
173. Lee, 163 So. at 488-89.
174. Mills-Jennings, Inc. v. Department of Liquor Control, 435 N.E.2d 407 (Ohio 1982).
175. Id. at 410.
176. Id.
177. Darlington Theatres, Inc. v. Coker, 190 S.C. 282, 2 S.E.2d 782 (1939).
178. Id. at 290,2 S.E.2d at 786; see supra note 51. However, the structure of the Darlington
Theatres opinion lends itself to misinterpretation. After setting out the three-element test, the
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the language found in the earlier case of State v. Pinchback.'79 The court in
Pinchback, interpreting the Lottery Act of 1762 (the precursor to the Lottery
Clause), 8 ' stated that "there may be an adventure or hazard without a lottery;
every throw of the die, even for an ordinary wager, is an adventure or hazard,
and I am sure it never entered the mind of any man that it constituted a
lottery.''
Clearly, the conventional approach of defining lotteries solely by
consideration, chance, and prize cannot withstand the weight of South Carolina
constitutional, statutory, and case-law authority-not to mention common
sense. Several states, recognizing the same inconsistencies between a broad
lottery definition and their own historically based conception of the term, have
attempted to add additional factors in order to achieve a more precise standard
by which to define and properly distinguish lotteries from other forms of
gambling.
A. The Alternative Approach
States questioning the conventional approach in search of a better method
for defining lotteries inevitably begin their journeys with a single case. More
specifically, with a single quote. In Phalen v. Virginias' the Court stated:
Experience has shown that the common forms of gambling are
comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-
spread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a few
persons and places, but the latter infests the whole community: it
enters every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard
earnings of the poor; it plunders the ignorant and simple."'
While these states recognize the essential elements of consideration, chance,
and prize common to all forms of gambling, they also understand the unique
nature of a lottery requires contemplation of additional factors. These factors
are designed to address the inherent characteristics of "widespread pestilence"
identified by the Supreme Court.
supreme court quoted different definitions of the term "lottery" from dictionaries and other state
case law-some of which were broad and others quite narrow in scope. Id. at 291-93, 2 S.E.2d
at 786-87. Essentially, a citation to one of these definitions can be used to justify almost any
construction of the term "lottery." Therefore, such citations should be carefully scrutinized. The
quotation cited here appears prior to the presentation of the three-element test and is not credited
by the court to any authority.
179. 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 33 (1818).
180. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
181. Pinchback, 4 S.C.L. (2 Mill) at 34.
182. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163 (1850).
183. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 49:549
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Foremost among this select group of states is Nevada. In Ex parte
Pierotti the Nevada Supreme Court added the element of "public nuisance"
to its definition of lotteries."85 Any gambling activity's inherent ability to reach
large segments of a given population placed it within the court's conception of
a lottery.'86 The Supreme Court of Florida took a similar approach in Lee v.
City of Miami,is7 referring to this widespread effect as the "primary test" of
what constitutes a lottery.'88 The Florida court considered its own lottery clause
as specifically addressing the type of state-chartered lottery popular in this
country prior to the mid-1800s' 89 In Knight v. State ex rel. Moore"9 the
Mississippi Supreme Court adhered to an even more restrictive approach,
identifying the sale of tickets as a necessary factor in its definition of the term
"lottery.''. This narrow reading of its lottery prohibition lead the court to hold
that the game of bingo is not a lottery."9
In addition to widespread effect and sale of tickets, several other factors
addressing the "widespread pestilence" characteristic of lotteries can be
identified."9 First, the complete absence of any skill in determining whether a
player wins or loses. 9 ' This is essentially the "pure chance" doctrine followed
by the English rule discussed in Part IV. Second, the lack of player
participation inthe activity. 95 While most games of chance require aparticipant
to go to some special place to play or assemble with a certain group of
individuals to participate, lotteries are solitary in nature and require no
comparable player participation.'96 Third, the placing of "money into a pool for
the chance to win a prize."'" Other forms of gambling, such as poker and
blackjack, do not normally involve pooling, "because the player bets against
184. 184 P. 209 (Nev. 1919).
185. Id. at 210 ("A lottery is prohibited by the Constitution as a public nuisance-a crime
against the good order and the economy of the state.").
186. Id. The court noted: "It is this extensive reach, and not merely its speculative purposes,
which makes lottery gambling so dangerous as to be a proper subject for constitutional
prohibition." Id.
187. 163 So. 486 (Fla. 1935).
188. Id. at 490.
189. Id. at 489-90.
190.574 So. 2d 662 (Miss. 1990).
191. Id. at 669.
192. Id. But see Val D. Ricks, Knight v. State ex rel. Moore: How Bingo Won the
MississippiLottery, 61 UMKCL. REV. 463 (1993) (presenting a highly critical assessmentofthe
Knight decision).
193. All of the additional factors suggested in Part V are not necessarily meant to be
essential elements of all lotteries. Rather, these factors are meant to guide those attempting to
distinguish lotteries from other forms of gambling.
194. See Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm'n, 869 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Mo. 1994).
195. See RosE, supra note 116, at 72.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 76.
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other players or against the house. 198 Finally, government sponsorship of the
gambling activity. 99 With the public resources available to local and state
governments, lotteries can reach into almost every segment of a targeted
community.
200
To summarize, the following factors (in addition to the essential elements
of consideration, chance, and prize) should be taken into account when
attempting to label a particular activity a "lottery": (1) widespread effect; (2)
sale of tickets or lots; (3) pure chance; (4) lack of player participation; (5)
pooling of funds; and (6) government sponsorship.
B. Application of Factors
In light of the above listed factors, does video poker qualify as a lottery?
Taking each factor separately, it becomes apparent that the sale of tickets
(factor two) and the pooling of funds (factor five) are clearly not present in
video poker. Video poker players do not purchase tickets or lots, nor do they
pool funds with other players. However, the application of the four remaining
factors is not as clear-cut. First, video poker may have a widespread effect
(factor one) because of the estimated 31,000 machines in South Carolina."'
However, this factor appears to address the inherent widespread effect of a
particular gambling activity-regardless of its resultant success and subsequent
growth. A single video poker machine, or even a large "video parlor"
containing many machines, cannot reach an entire community in the same
manner as a typical lottery. Attributing the widespread effect factor to video





Part IV of this Comment explored the presence of pure chance (factor
three) in video poker, with no resulting clear answer on the issue. The degree
of player participation (factor four) in video poker is also unclear. While video
poker players must participate by physically traveling to a location in order to
play the machines, participation with other players is missing because a video
poker player only interacts with a computer program. Finally, the extent of
government sponsorship (factor six) of video poker is also arguable. South
198. Santoni, supra note 154, at 1129-30.
199. See Mills-Jennings, Inc. v. Department of Liquor Control, 435 N.E.2d 407,410 (Ohio
1982).
200. See Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850) ("[Lotteries] infestI the
whole community ... [,] enter] every dwelling... [, and] reacho] every class .... ).
201. Clif LeBlanc, Video Poker Test Could Be In Supreme Court's Hands, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 25, 1998, at A6.
202. The author admits the presence of this factor is arguable. See State v. Coats, 74 P.2d
1102, 1111 (Or. 1938) (Kelly, J., concurring) (arguing that the widespread presence of pinball
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Carolina has carved out a statutory exception for video poker 3 and passed an
entire act designed to regulate the industry.2" In addition, the state receives
revenue in the form of license fees paid by video poker owners. 5 Does this
rise to the level of government sponsorship? Certainly not to the extent of state-
run "ticket" lotteries. In state-run lotteries, the costs of sponsoring the lottery
are paid by government and the profits go into the state coffers.' 6 With video
poker in South Carolina, the costs incurred and profits received are the sole
domain of the private sector. In addition, South Carolina is not actively
promoting and advertising video poker to the public. In states with traditional
"ticket" lotteries, the state normally engages in widespread advertising because
it has a financial interest in doing so.2"7
Although several of these factors may be present in video poker, no factor
is clearly evident. This result is not surprising because the factors suggested by
the alternative approach are rooted in the particular history and unique nature
of lotteries as they developed in this country. Logically, therefore, video poker
seems to fall under the larger sphere of gambling and games of chance in
general (defined by the three-element test)-yet not within the specialized
subset of lotteries (defined by the three-element test and additional factors). To
suggest otherwise would appear to strip the term "lottery" of its historical and
common sense meaning.
VI. CONCLUSION
The modem application of the law surrounding lotteries should not be
divorced from the historical foundation upon which it lies. The nature and
operation of lotteries in the early years of this nation is of no great mystery.
Because of their unique ability to reach large masses of people, lotteries were
favored by states and local governments that chartered them as an alternative
to taxes. However, the unique structure of lotteries also leant itself to rampant
fraud and misuse of funds by those chartered to operate them. In response,
states like South Carolina chose to constitutionally outlaw lotteries, thereby
203. S.C. CODEANN. § 16-19-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1997); see supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
204. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
205. License fee revenues are estimated at $61 million for the upcoming budget year in
South Carolina. Sponhour, supra note 4, at Al.
206. Rychlak, supra note 17, at 47-50.
207. See Darlington Theatres, Inc. v. Coker, 190 S.C. 282, 290, 2 S.E.2d 782, 786 (1939)
("[lit is apparent that the constitutional and legislative prohibition [of lotteries] is directed at a
special type of vice in thefields of advertising and gift enterprises--the type that has come to be
denominated both in the law and in common parlance by the word lottery.") (emphasis added);
State v. Pinchback, 4 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 33, 34 (1818) ("[The term lottery] embraces only one class
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foreclosing the ability of future state legislatures to sanction lotteries as revenue
raising devices."'
Unfortunately, the conventional common-law test for defining lotteries
renders results inconsistent with the historical conception of the term.
Application of the conventional three-element test, potentially placing all
gambling activities under the general label of "lottery," forces a meaning and
scope upon the term inconsistent with its historical and popular usage.2 9 The
alternative approach suggested in this Comment attempts to remedy the logical
inconsistency of the three-element test by adding additional factors that address
the unique nature of lotteries as expressed by the United States Supreme
Court's "widespread pestilence" characterization.
The application of the Lottery Clause to video poker ultimately depends
upon how the South Carolina Supreme Court chooses to approach the term
"lottery." The court's initial selection of an appropriate standard to define the
term likely will determine the outcome of the certified question in the Johnson
case. The sweeping range of the conventional three-element approach places
video poker in substantial jeopardy of constitutionally mandated extinction. The
more reserved scope of the alternative approach suggests just the opposite
result. The court can cite legal authority for either approach. Perhaps the only
sure bet is recognizing that, contrary to the Attorney General's belief, the
lottery question presented in Johnson is indeed "a difficult legal question."
210
Michael William Eisenrauch
208. Of course, the General Assembly and the people retain the power to amend the state
constitution to sanction new lotteries. See S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § I (requiring a two-thirds
approval in both the House of Representatives and the Senate and a majority approval by the
electorate).
209. See Darlington Theatres, 190 S.C. at 292,2 S.E.2d at 786 ("'The word 'lottery' it has
been held, has no technical, legal meaning but must be construed in thepopular sense."' (quoting
17 R.C.L. 1209-10) (emphasis added)).
210. See supra note * and accompanying quotation; see also ROSE, supra note 116, at 75 ("It
is safe to say that there is no field of law in the United States today that is as complex and
outdated, and as little studied, as the law of gambling.").
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